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Abstract
The objective of this paper is to explain the reasons behind the dynamics of labor
productivity (LP) growth during a process of institutional and structural change. We
show - by means of a theoretical discussion and an empirical analysis, conducted on a
sample of 25 European countries for the period 1995–2016 - that four main channels
contribute to explaining the evolution of LP. First, the speed of investment, which
incorporates innovation and favors an increase of LP growth; second, the speed of
Research and Development (R&D), which allows for the creation of new ideas and
shows the “dynamism of a society”, having positive effects on LP; third, the deregu-
lation of labor markets and the increase of temporary employment, both of which
encourage labor-intensive strategies by firms, with low value-added and low produc-
tivity gains; fourth, the direction of structural change, which can take place toward
services industries affected by “Baumol’s disease”.
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1 Introduction
In recent years, several developed countries have experienced a productivity slowdown,
which has taken place in the middle of a process of institutional and structural change.
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As shown in Fig. 1, a common trend seems to emerge. Independently of the socio-
economic welfare model,1 labor productivity growth in the European countries2 in the
four panels has displayed a decreasing or stagnating pattern.3
The main purpose of this article is to provide a theoretical and empirical
analysis of the impact of some major socio-economic phenomena on the
dynamics of labor productivity. We aim to show both theoretically and by
means of an econometric model applied to EU countries that four main
channels contribute to explaining the evolution of our variable of interest. First
would be the speed of investment (measured by the rate of investment growth),
which incorporates innovation and favors an expansion of aggregate demand
and an increase of LP (in the sense of Kaldor and Schumpeter). We will
discuss the role of institutions4 in fostering innovation; in this sense we build
a bridge between Schumpeterian and Kaldorian insights. More specifically,
Kaldor’s ideas – and in particular his technical progress function – are recalled,
to stress the importance of investment in physical assets as a vector of
technological advancement. However, the productivity stagnation commenced,
in different countries, a few years earlier than the slowdown in capital accu-
mulation. Hence, the latter cannot be the causa causans of the former, but more
a reinforcing factor for an already underway process. For this reason, we look
for other co-determinants of the phenomenon we are trying to explain. The
second channel is the speed of investment in Research and Development
(R&D), which allows for the creation of new ideas and shows the “dynamism
of a society” in the sense of Kaldor, with positive effects on LP. The third
channel is the deregulation of the labor market and the increase of temporary
employment, along with stagnant wages, all of which encourage labor-intensive
strategies by firms, with low value-added and low productivity gains, following
the Sylos Labini approach. The fourth channel is the direction of structural
change. If this takes place in services industries experiencing Baumol’s disease,
which suffer from specific obstacles to innovation and tend to be intensive in
unskilled labor, there is little room for productivity gains and labor productivity
is likely to slow down. Therefore, we argue, structural change needs to be
governed and channeled with proper incentives both in the labor market and in
the investment sector. Policies and institutions are crucial for this objective.
Innovation and technical progress take place within an institutional framework
1 A partial exception is represented by Central and Eastern European countries, where the growth of labor
productivity has, to an extent, flattened, but at generally higher rates. It is not, however, the purpose of this
article to discuss the differences and specificities of each country and/or their welfare models.
2 The sixteen countries in Figure 1 are a sub-sample of the countries in our empirical analysis.
3 See Gordon (2016) for a discussion centered on the US case, which lies outside the scope of this work. In his
book, the author argues convincingly that the wave of technological improvements that has characterized the
last decades, namely the IT “revolution”, does not have the same potential for long-term growth as did Great
Inventions from the past (e.g., electricity or the internal combustion engine). Hence, contemporary economies
are stuck in a state of technological stagnation, made worse by the contemporaneous issues of increasing
income inequality, aging populations and other “headwinds”.
4 We will refer, throughout the article, to a broad definition of institution, which relates to “conventions,
customs, habits of thinking and modes of doing which make up the scheme of arrangements which we call ‘the
economic order’” and also with the way in which institutions interact to comprise “the organization of modern
industrial society” (Hamilton 1919, p. 311).
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able to create the proper incentives for agents to invest, risk and interact. This
framework also needs to adapt to the new technological systems that have
meanwhile emerged.
Over the last three to four decades, many advanced economies have experi-
enced significant changes in their productive structures and their industrial
strategies.5 While the post-WWII period of expansion – qualified by some
scholars as “The Golden Age of Capitalism” (Marglin and Schor 1990) –
was characterized by the manufacturing industry exerting the leading role, in
more recent years a massive shift in employment has been taking place in most
Western countries. Indeed, a steady decline in the share of workers employed in
manufacturing and a transition towards the service sector is a well-known
feature of contemporary capitalism.6 Additionally, as highlighted, for example,
5 See Tridico and Pariboni (2017) for some descriptive evidence.
6 We will not discuss the causes behind this process here. See Autor et al. (2013) for an analysis of the impact
of Chinese import competition on the US labor market. Rodrik (2016) identified globalization and labor-
saving technical progress as the main explanatory factors for employment loss in manufacturing in advanced
economies. See also Schettkat and Yocarini (2006) for a thorough review of the literature on the ‘tertiarization’
of advanced economies, in which the authors uncover three main explanations: differentials in productivity
growth among industries (more on this later, in the discussion of Baumol’s contribution); shifts in the inter-
industry division of labor and the increasing importance of outsourcing from the manufacturing to the service
industries; finally (and this is the one preferred by the authors) “the shift to services in the advanced economies
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Fig. 1 Rate of growth of labor productivity (moving average over three years), selected countries. (See
Figure 2 in the appendix for some descriptive evidence on non-European countries, which substantiate the
claim of a worldwide productivity slowdown.) Source: own elaboration on Eurostat data
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in Szirmai (2012) and Rodrik (2016), such deindustrialization7 trends are
similarly observable in developing countries, with a relative exception being
presented by Asian industrial exporters.
In the remainder of this article, we will try to explore channels that operate
through both the demand and the supply side of the economy, with a special
focus being placed on labor market flexibilization and transformations in the
productive structure of the economies involved. In Sections 2–4, we will
conduct a selected review of the literature to try to uncover possible explana-
tions for the slowdown of productivity growth that is being experienced by
most European countries. The paper proceeds as follows: in Section 2 we
explore the possible threats to the dynamics of labor productivity that can arise
from an ungoverned process of structural change. To do this, we draw first on
the classic works of Baumol and Kaldor, which are then enriched with more
recent contributions that outline the heterogeneous nature of different service
industries. Section 3 establishes a link between labor flexibility and productiv-
ity, claiming that a certain degree of rigidity in labor market institutions can be
beneficial as it deters the adoption of labor-intensive strategies and pushes,
through creative destruction, non-innovators out of the market. Section 4 dis-
cusses the role of institutions in fostering innovation and investment and tries
to find the meeting point between Keynes, Schumpeter and Kaldor. In
Section 5, we submit the main ideas of Sections 2–4 to empirical scrutiny by
means of a panel data analysis conducted on a sample of 25 European
countries8 for the period 1995–2016. The results are broadly consistent with
our expectations. The last section concludes.
2 Structural change and labor productivity: A brief review
In this paper, we want to assess whether the process of structural change – briefly
illustrated above – can contribute to explaining recent trends in labor productivity.9 The
literature has been debating this issue for decades and no consensus has emerged. On
the one hand, it has been argued and found, for example in the influential empirical
work of Hartwig (2011), that “structural change has a growth-dampening effect”
(Hartwig 2011, p. 485) for both the US and a group of fifteen European countries.
This idea is obviously not new and dates back at least to Baumol and Bowen (1965),
Kaldor (1966) and Baumol (1967). It is easily summarized as follows: “a transfer of
resources from manufacturing to services may provide a structural change burden”
(Szirmai and Verspagen 2015, p. 47).
7 Throughout this article, we use the term deindustrialization to encapsulate the relative loss of importance and
weight of manufacturing. However, as noted in Szirmai (2012), according to the International Standard
Industrial Classification of All Economic Activities (ISIC), the industrial sector also comprises mining, utilities
and construction. Here, we will follow Szirmai (as well as the standard use) and refer to a narrower concept
that incorporates only the manufacturing industry.
8 The 25 countries in our sample are Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark,
Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Due to a
lack of data availability, we had to drop Croatia, Malta, Poland and Spain from our analysis.
9 See Table 10 in the Appendix, for a summary of the arguments put forward in this section.
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On the other hand, in more recent years the very idea of the existence of
Baumol’s disease affecting the dynamics of aggregate labor productivity has
been questioned and critically discussed.10 In an influential contribution, for
example, Triplett and Bosworth claim sic et simpliciter that “Baumol’s disease
has been cured” (Triplett and Bosworth 2003, p. 23) and that the over-emphasis
in previous years on such a disease might have been due to difficulties in
correctly measuring productivity in services.11
In our view, nonetheless, at least several certain service industries have a
limited potential for productivity gains, being structurally defined by labor-
intensive production processes. Moreover, as pointed out by Wölfl (2005),
service industries might suffer from specific obstacles to innovation: for exam-
ple, the average small size of firms in this sector (and the related difficulties in
gathering the necessary financing) leads to low investment, specifically in high-
risk, high-tech capital assets (Wölfl 2005, p. 55). Added to this, investments in
R&D and in workforce training tend to be underfunded and industries operating
in the service sector often resort to non-firm specific technologies and knowl-
edge that has been developed elsewhere (ibid.). Finally, we find persuasive the
arguments that have been collectively labeled as the “Manufacturing Impera-
tive” (Rodrik 2011), discussed and summarized in Cirillo and Guarascio (2015).
In this scenario, an advanced manufacturing sector generates innovation spill-
over into service industries; manufactured capital goods used by the service
sector embody most of the technical progress and knowledge generated in the
economy (see Kaldor’s discussion below). Moreover, being tradable, they are an
efficient vector for disseminating innovation.
Maroto and Rubalcaba advance a more nuanced view. Indeed, they list
“intensive utilization of the labor force, innovation barriers, low competition,
the smaller size of enterprises or differences within labor market conditions”
(2008, p. 349) as internal, structural characteristics of the service industries that
can potentially slow down the pace of technological progress and innovation.12
They also notice that, “to a certain extent” and at a very aggregate level,
Baumol’s disease can still be considered valid; nonetheless, the picture across
different service industries is uneven and sub-sectors such as transport, com-
munication, finance and some business-related services contribute substantially
to productivity growth.13
10 A qualification and a reassessment of the Baumol’s disease has been advanced by Baumol himself. See, for
example, Baumol et al. (1989) and Baumol (2002).
11 See Griliches (1994), Hartwig (2008) and Harchaoui (2016). On the other hand, see also Byrne et al. (2016),
where it is convincingly argued that the observed labor productivity slowdown does not arise “from growing
mismeasurement of the gains from innovation in information technology-related goods and services” (Byrne
et al. 2016, p. 109) and Syverson (2017). In both Byrne et al. (2016) and Syverson (2017), it is also stressed
that “nonmarket” benefits, in terms of consumer surpluses and estimated gains in nonmarket production that
arise from the adoption of IT technologies, do not compensate for the productivity slowdown, which remains
sizable even when taking these factors into account.
12 Similar arguments are made in Wölfl (2005).
13 See Maroto-Sánchez and Cuadrado-Roura (2009) and Wölfl (2005) for an analysis of productivity
differentials among different service sub-sectors. See also Daniels et al. (2011) and Di Meglio et al. (2015),
among others, who try to relate the debate on structural change –and its peculiar directions in different
institutional contexts– to the ‘Varieties of Capitalism’ approach.
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3 Labor flexibility and productivity
One of the aims of this work is to assess the impact of the generalized flexibilization of
labor relations on the dynamics of labor productivity.14 There are several theoretical
arguments put forward in the relevant literature that present a negative relationship
between labor flexibility and productivity.15 As argued by Storm and Naastepad, unstable
labor relations may erode social capital and trust and induce firms to invest less readily in
workers’ firm-specific human capital (Storm and Naastepad 2012, 2015). A similar line of
reasoning can also be found in the perspective of the models of the New Keynesian
Economics, which consider work effort – at the margin - to be positively correlated with
wages; so, in that sense, unstable jobs, flexibility, scarce incentives and low-paid jobs
pushworkers to put less effort into their work.Moreover, this type of employment leads to
a lower likelihood that firms and workers will invest in training and education to improve
the quality of human capital culminating in lower returns in terms of productivity, ceteris
paribus, for the economic system (Salop 1979; Shapiro and Stiglitz 1984).
From a non-mainstream perspective, similar arguments can be found in the works of
Vergeer and Kleinknecht. In Vergeer and Kleinknecht (2010), the authors perform a
panel data analysis based on 19 OECD countries, for the period 1960–2004. Among
their main results, flexible labor relations are found to damage labor productivity
growth through multiple channels16 (p. 393) and to disincentivize knowledge accumu-
lation. Interestingly, Vergeer and Kleinknecht provide evidence that the labor produc-
tivity slowdown is not only due to the creation of precarious, deregulated, and low-
productivity jobs, but the productivity of existing jobs is negatively affected as well.
Vergeer and Kleinknecht (2014) perform a similar exercise involving 20 OECD
countries in the same time span (1960–2004) of Vergeer and Kleinknecht (2010),
which substantially confirm the main findings presented there. Attention is drawn to
the fact that easier hiring and firing procedures, which result in shorter job tenures,
inhibit the formation of firm-specific, “tacit” knowledge and hinder the functioning of
the “routinized” innovation model (Vergeer and Kleinknecht 2014, p. 383).
Lucidi and Kleinknecht (2010) identify four channels through which labor flexibility
can lead to a poor performance in labor productivity growth: a) in the spirit of the works
of Sylos-Labini and Schumpeter, (a lack of) flexibility induces the adoption of capital-
intensive techniques of production and favors a process of creative destruction, pushing
non-innovators, who are unable to cope with a higher cost of labor and tighter
regulations out of the market; b) short-term labor relations lead to under-investment
in workforce training; c) better job protection prevents the creation of a conflictual
working environment, helps with the establishment of more cooperative industrial
relations and elicits employees’ commitment and trust; d) flexible and precarious jobs
are conducive to low wages, so if an economy is wage-led (Bhaduri and Marglin 1990),
this causes a slowdown in aggregate demand and consequently in the dynamics of labor
14 See Table 11 in the appendix for a summary.
15 The argument is, obviously, far from uncontroversial. See, for example, Nickell and Layard (1999); Saint-
Paul (2000), Bassanini and Ernst (2002) or Scarpetta and Tressel (2004) for an opposite view on the
relationship between labor flexibilization and productivity. See also Vergeer and Kleinknecht (2010) and
Lucidi and Kleinknecht (2010) for a rebuttal of the theses presented in these works.
16 The authors mention “capital-labor substitution, vintage effects, induced technical change, creative destruc-
tion and demand-pull effects” (Vergeer and Kleinknecht 2010, p. 393).
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productivity, according to the Kaldor-Verdoorn law (Verdoorn 1949; Kaldor 1978). The
authors conclude their analysis, focused on the Italian case, finding that the Italian labor
market reforms “shifted Italy towards… a labour-intensive and low-productive growth
path” (Lucidi and Kleinknecht 2010, p. 541).
Kleinknecht et al. (2016) detail a further argument to support the view that flexibilitymay
damage labor productivity: firms with a higher share of “flexible” workers tend to have
higher shares of non-productive, managerial personnel. Higher labor turnover and easy
firings result in a lack of trust that must be compensated for by greater levels of control.
In Dosi17 et al. (2017), the authors incorporate an explicit analysis of labor market
flexibilization into their ‘Schumpeter meeting Keynes’ Agent Based Model (ABM)
model.18 They conclude that reforms oriented to this goal contribute to increased levels
of inequality and a higher rate of unemployment, with no gain in terms of the long-term
growth of productivity. A more flexible labor market, indeed, restrains the operating of
the “Schumpeterian engine of innovation and growth” (Dosi et al. 2017, p. 25).
There is also a sizable stream of literature that directly addresses a specific feature of
labor market flexibility, namely, the liberalization and widespread diffusion of tempo-
rary contracts. Daveri and Parisi’s (2015) study of the relationship between employees’
experience, productivity and innovation conclude that “firms endowed with a high
share of temporary workers always exhibit lower productivity growth, no matter what
its innovation activity” (Daveri and Parisi 2015, p. 903).
Blanchard and Landier (2002) identify a potential “perverse” effect of the liberali-
zation of fixed-term contracts: after the expiration of the temporary contract, even if the
match between the temporary worker and the employer is productive, the latter could
still opt for replacing the former with a new worker under a temporary contract instead
of issuing a regular contract to the former employee because this would enhance her
bargaining position and allow her to gain a higher wage. The result is that firms can be
induced to “design routine, low-productivity jobs, which they can fill through the use of
fixed-term contracts” (Blanchard and Landier 2002, p. 244).
Battisti and Vallanti (2013) find that a larger share of temporary workers within
the firm is detrimental to workers’ effort - studied in terms of absenteeism - and
hence to firm-level productivity. In Cappellari et al. (2012), the negative influence
of temporary workers on the dynamics of productivity operates by activating a
substitution of workers for capital, negatively affecting the capital/labor ratio.19
Cirillo et al. (2017) discuss the effects on several dimensions of the labor market of
a recent Italian reform (the so-called ‘Jobs Act’) that, among other things, heavily
liberalized the terms for the use of fixed-term contracts. Perhaps the most interest-
ing finding points to a strong bias toward the creation of new jobs, which tend to be
mostly concentrated in low-tech, low-innovation, precarious-job service sectors.20
17 Dosi and co-authors have developed, along several years, an innovative stream of research, wherein the
analytical tool used is a class of models labeled as ‘Keynes meets Schumpeter’.
18 With this expression, we refer to “a model in which a multitude of (heterogeneous) elements or objects
interact with each other and the environment” (Delli Gatti and Gallegati 2018, p. 7).
19 See also Jona Lasinio and Vallanti (2013, p. 22).
20 Jona Lasinio and Vallanti (2013) develop a similar argument with respect to the effects of the diffusion of
temporary contracts. See also Auer et al. (2005), where the authors find a positive correlation between
employment tenure and labor productivity, as job stability (as opposed to a short-term contract) is necessary
for job training.
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Moving the analysis to the European level, Cirillo and Guarascio (2015, p. 160)
maintain that such “cost competitiveness strategies aiming to compete by reducing
labour costs weaken the foundation for a technological upgrade of the economy”.21
Boeri and Garibaldi (2007) investigate the consequences of the introduction
of an employment “two-tier regime,” which allows firms to hire both permanent
and temporary workers. Their theoretical model predicts a permanent fall in
average productivity, due to the functioning of the law of diminishing returns:
the possibility of hiring workers under a fixed-term contract stimulates employ-
ment, which, however, expands in a region of the demand curve where mar-
ginal productivity is decreasing. They also validate their result through an
empirical analysis, which stresses “the negative effect of the spread of fixed
term contracts on labour productivity” (Boeri and Garibaldi 2007, p. 378).
Drawing from this literature review, we include “temporary employees as a
percentage of the total number of employees,” as a proxy for labor market
flexibility, among the determinants of labor productivity growth, expecting that
there will be a negative influence on the latter of our variables of interest.22
4 Toward a model of labor productivity: Institutions, investment
and innovation
John Maynard Keynes’ work focuses on the role of aggregate demand -and, in
particular, of investment and government expenditures- in determining the level of
employment, income and production. Technical progress, on the other hand, is not a
main concern of the British economist.
With few exceptions, on the other hand, both endogenous growth models
(Romer 1990; Dinopoulos and Segerstrom 1999) and evolutionary models
(Nelson and Winter 1982) are driven by Schumpeterian characteristics with
endogenous innovation, but do not take into consideration demand dynamics
and the interaction between innovation and aggregate demand. Among the
exceptions we hinted at, it is worth mentioning Dosi et al. (2010) – and more
generally the ‘Keynes meets Schumpeter’ class of models developed by Dosi
and co-authors - who present an Agent Based Model (ABM) that is evolution-
ary rooted and explores the influence of aggregate demand and the endogenous
drivers of technical progress.
At the intersection between Keynes and Schumpeter, one can find the
“technical production function” of Kaldor (1961),23 which depends on invest-
ment and on “society’s ‘dynamism,’ meaning by this both inventiveness and
readiness to change and to experiment” (ibid., p. 208). In fact, the technical
progress function of Kaldor, represented below in eq. (1), has two components:
the first has an exogenous nature and is given by the parameter α, identified
21 A similar argument is made in Storm and Naastepad (2015).
22 As Boeri and Garibaldi (2007) notice, in most European countries, the increase in labor flexibility has been
taking place mainly through the liberalization of the terms for the use of temporary contracts.
23 See also Tridico and Pariboni (2018) for a recent discussion.
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with “society’s dynamism,” while the second part of the equation, βgk, states
that the evolution of labor productivity is a positive function of the rate of
growth of capital per worker k.24
gλ ¼ α þ βgk ð1Þ
The rationale is the following: given that most technical innovations and improvements
are incorporated into machinery and equipment, for any given level of society’s
dynamism and inventiveness, the economy can absorb only a bounded amount of
technical change, which is an increasing function of the speed with which capital is
accumulated.
In Schumpeter and in the neo-Schumpeterian tradition, the creation and incorpora-
tion of technology depend on the economy’s existing institutional arrangements
(Romero 2014). Hence, the α of Kaldor’s equation and its possibility to be continu-
ously translated at a higher level depend on institutions, norms, rules and behavior
identified generally with “society’s dynamism,”
Kaldor (1970) provides another important element of connection with the evolu-
tionary approach, which is the notion of ‘cumulative causation’: a self-reinforcing
dynamic in the circular process of investment demand leading to innovation and
stimulating further investment. As Courvisanos states (2012, p. 297), R&D expenditure
is crucial in the endogenous innovation process,25 where, in particular, large firms
spend more on R&D and activate more patents and innovation routes, while exogenous
innovation refers to technological paradigm shift. This is the reason why, in our
econometric model, R&D along with general investment are both crucial in
generating productivity gains.
This cumulative process is also present in the notion of path dependency of most
evolutionary models, for which the pioneer was Veblen (1919) in his theory of
cumulative change. In Veblen, cumulative change explains the dynamic of progressive
institutional change.26 In essence, it starts with technological innovation, which alters
habits and behaviors in a community which in turn, creates further innovation in the
sciences. Following the logic of Veblen, institutional change moves from technological
change to following a cumulative process.
Veblen’s (and Kaldor’s) idea of cumulative change is also the basis for any formal
change. The institutional framework adapts to the new technological systems. Howev-
er, the uncertainty of profits that a technological shift may generate could push firms
toward resistant behavior and lobbying against the changes. That is why Veblen argues
that technological innovation alters habits, both directly and indirectly, through changes
in the formal framework and resistance in the informal behavior. Large corporations
24 It should be remembered that Kaldor’s treatment of capital in the context of the “technical progress
function” is subject to serious criticism, related to the aggregation problem and to the utilization of “a measure
of capital as a homogeneous physical quantity” (McCombie and Spreafico 2016, p. 1124), despite the results
of the Cambridge controversy on capital. See McCombie and Spreafico (2016) for a detailed discussion of
these issues and for a restatement of Kaldor’s insights on growth and productivity.
25 On the role of R&D in boosting productivity, see, for example, Fagerberg and Verspagen (2002), Griffith
et al. (2004) and Edquist and Henrekson (2017).
26 See also the work of Clarence Ayres (Ayres 1944) for an early and prescient evolutionary view of
technology and, in particular, for the analysis of the dichotomic relationship between the dynamic behavior
of technology and the static behavior of institutions, the nature of which can hinder technological change
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with the direct or indirect support of states may wish to protect the old technological
paradigm in order to defend existing capital value. This may generate institutional
tension and also rates of labor productivity growth that differ from one sector to
another. At the macro level, one can have limitations of the scale of production that
can lead to a decline in economic development, despite (fragmented and unintegrated)
technological progress having occurred (Rosenberg 1972, 1976).
5 The model
Drawing from the theoretical background put forward in the paper and, in particular, in
the second, third and fourth sections, we are going now to test the main implications of
our theoretical analysis through a simple econometric model that relies on a set of 25
EU countries in the period between 1995 and 2016. This was a very important period27
for technological change and innovation. Most advanced economies went through a
radical shift in their technological paradigm during this period that dramatically
changed their production techniques and products and accelerated the shift of employ-
ment toward service industries. The knowledge-based economy was simultaneously
consolidated and new forms of digitalization and robotization of the economy seemed
to take place, in particular after the financial crises of 2008–09. Moreover, an increasing
number of firms (and sometimes governments) seem to have understood the crucial role
played by R&D.28
The model that we are going to estimate on our panel (25 EU countries in the period














it−k þ βo⋅Mseit þ βq⋅Sseit þ β f ⋅BDseit þ βe
⋅TWit þ δt þ ϵit
Where:
& LP˙it is the rate of growth of labor productivity per hour worked (i.e. real value
added per hour worked), for the whole economy;
& INV˙ it is the rate of growth of non-residential investment
29 (both public and private)
in real terms; we expect βs coefficients to be positive, since investment growth
should reflect increasing capital stock. As mentioned in Section 4 when discussing
Kaldor’s technical progress function, technical innovations and improvements tend
to be incorporated into machinery and equipment. For this reason, capital
27 This very same period can be, ideally, split into two sub-periods: the first one, up to around 2003–2004,
experienced relatively intense productivity growth, mostly driven by the information technology boom.
However, in the last 14–15 years, productivity growth has again been on a mostly stagnant path (see
Gordon 2016 for a detailed and insightful analysis with respect to the US).
28 See, for example, Mazzucato (2016) and Engel et al. (2016).
29 We subtract, from total non-residential investment, the R&D investment, which is considered
independently.
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accumulation is likely to exert a positive influence on technical progress and on the
dynamics of labor productivity;
& R&D˙it is the rate of growth of R&D investment (both public and private); we
expect βk coefficients to be positive. R&D growth should reflect increasing
knowledge accumulation or, using Kaldor’s words, the dynamism of a society in
terms of ideas. This contributes, for given levels of the capital stock, to the
activation of endogenous innovation processes and of innovation routes, as in the
Schumpeterian theoretical tradition;
& Mseit is the share of employment in the manufacturing sector, as hours worked; we
expect this variable to affect positively our variable of interest. Based on the
literature reviewed in Section 2, the gradual abandonment of manufacturing can
produce a drag on labor productivity growth. This sector, indeed, generates rela-
tively high innovation spillovers; most technological innovations are embodied in
manufactured capital goods and, finally, the size of the manufacture sector is
traditionally conducive to larger economies of scale;
& Sseit is the share of employment in the skilled service sectors (Information and
Communication, Financial, Insurance and Real Estate activities, Professional Busi-
ness Services), as hours worked. Based on the literature reviewed in Section 2 – see,
for example, Maroto and Rubalcaba (2008) and Maroto-Sánchez and Cuadrado-
Roura (2009) - one might expect the impact of this variable to be positive;
& BDseit is the share of employment – in terms of hours worked - in the following
industries: Food and Accommodation, Logistics and Social Services, which we
label “Baumol’s disease” service industries. We expect BDse to affect labor
productivity growth negatively since, as pointed out, for example, in Wölfl
(2005), specific obstacles to innovation might exist, from there being an
average small size of firms in these industries to the difficulties of gathering
the finance necessary to invest in high-risk, high-tech capital stock. Low
investments in R&D and in workforce training also contribute to the ex-
pectation of a negative relationship between employment in these industries
and labor productivity growth;
& TWit is the share of temporary employees
30 in total employment; we expect TW to
affect labor productivity growth negatively, since flexible, less well-paid jobs
(usually precarious) are often used by firms as a substitute for technological
improvements, within a strategy of labor cost competitiveness, as demonstrated
also by Sylos Labini.31 The share of temporary employees is the proxy we chose for
labor flexibility since, as noted in Boeri and Garibaldi (2007) and Cappellari et al.
(2012), labor flexibilization in most European countries has been taking place
mostly through the liberalization of the terms for the use of temporary contracts.32
30 Based on the Eurostat definition, “[t]emporary employment includes work under a fixed-term contract, as
against permanent work where there is no end-date” (Eurostat Glossary).
31 See, for example, Sylos Labini (1999).
32 This finding is confirmed by an analysis of trends in the EPL (Employment Protection Legislation) indexes,
developed by the OECD. The EPL for temporary contracts steadily decreases for most countries during the
time span covered by the available data, while the EPL for regular contracts displays a flatter pattern.
However, the last year for which the EPL time series are available is 2013 and, also for this reason, we prefer
to include the share of temporary employees as our measure of labor flexibility. See Section 3 for a review of
the literature.
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& δt denotes year-trend dummies; notice that we use random effect models
with respect to the panel variable and year-trend dummies to deal with
common time-related shocks and thus to remove correlations in errors across
countries.
Finally, some control variables were used, such as:
& INV/GDPit is the share of non-residential investment in GDP
& R&D/GDPit is the level of R&D expenditures, performed by all sectors, as a
percentage of GDP
& LPconvit is labor productivity level of country i, expressed as a percentage of the
labor productivity level of EU28 countries as an aggregate
& εit denotes the error term.
In Table 1, we summarize the discussed variables and their expected impact on
labor productivity growth. In Table 2, we report the results, which refer to six
different model specifications, estimated by means of a GLS-based (random
effect) regression. In detail, we first estimated the baseline model (column I).
Then, we extended the analysis (column II), introducing also a dummy-year
variable; the results are consistent with those of the baseline model. In column
III, a regular time fixed effect was introduced and results of the baseline are
not altered. Column IV also reports an OLS model. In column V, we included
among the regressors, the lagged value of the dependent variable, while in
column VI we added three more control variables to the model: 1) to control
for some degree of convergence, we included the level of country i’s labor
productivity as a percentage of the EU28 labor productivity level. Moreover, we
control for 2) the (non-residential) investment to GDP ratio and to capture a
broader picture of a country’s commitment to R&D, 3) R&D expenditures as a
percentage of GDP.33
The inclusion of these control variables does not alter the main insights of
the baseline model. Indeed, these are statistically not significant. The speed of
total and R&D investment seems to be what matters for the growth of labor
productivity. This is also consistent with the Schumpeterian and Kaldorian
theoretical approaches proposed and discussed earlier. The hypothesis of con-
vergence - i.e., that a country the labor productivity level of which is relatively
low should grow faster- is not confirmed, since the coefficient of labor
33 See also Table 4 in the Appendix, where we present the results of further robustness checks. In column I,
following the suggestion of a referee, we replace the rates of growth of non-residential investment and of R&D
investment with the rate of growth of an overall variable that encompasses both. In other words, totINV = INV+
R&D, where we defined INV as non-residential real gross fixed capital formation, excluding R&D real gross
fixed capital formation (real gross fixed capital formation, total assets minus real gross fixed capital
formation, dwellings minus real gross fixed capital formation, Research and Development). See also Table 3
in the Appendix. In column II we restrict the analysis to the Eurozone countries (although the countries in our
sample are 17, due to the lack of some data for Spain and Malta). The main difference with the rest of the
empirical analysis is that the positive and significative coefficient attributed to employment in the ‘skilled
services’ sector becomes significant, while the coefficient of temporary workers is no longer significant.
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productivity level (as a percentage of EU28 labor productivity) is not statisti-
cally significant. Finally, according to the Hausman test, reported in the Ap-
pendix in Table 5, the random effect estimates are consistent. The F-test in
Model IV suggests not to include a time trend, despite the fact that, in Model
III, with a time fixed effect, between the variance of Rsquared increases, the
between variance remains very high, and explains most of the variation among
countries, while the within variance left unexplained is smaller.
Moreover, we performed a bi-variate causality test (Granger 1969) – based
on a panel vector autoregression methodology (see Abrigo and Love 2016) –
between labor productivity growth and each of the independent variables used
in the baseline model. As shown in Table 6 in the Appendix, we can reject the
null hypothesis that the set of independent variables of our model does not
Granger-cause LP growth.
In addition to the usual regression statistics, some diagnostic issues were also
explored. Since we have to deal with a relatively small (imperfect) collinearity
among some predictors, as well as the fact that some endogeneity concerns can
be advanced, we carried out a variance inflation factor (VIF) test, which aims
to exclude systematic multicollinearity among explanatory variables; see also
the correlation Table 7 in the Appendix. Notice that when VIF is high, there is
high multicollinearity, and consequently regression coefficients would be unsta-
ble. Despite the fact that there are no formal thresholds for determining the
presence of multicollinearity, the higher the VIF values, the greater the corre-
lation of the variable with others. Values of more than four or five are
sometimes regarded as being moderate to high, and values higher than 10 are
often regarded in the literature as indicating multicollinearity. As can be seen in
Table 8, the highest VIF value in our econometrics is 1.98 (while the VIF mean
is 1.38) and since higher values signify that it is difficult or almost impossible
to assess accurately the contribution of predictors to a model, we can exclude
collinearity and state, with a higher degree of certainty, that multicollinearity is
not biasing the estimated coefficients. A unit root test was also used (Im-
Pesaran-Shin) to verify whether the panel data contains unit roots or if it is
stationary. The null hypothesis tested, which we reject with a level of signif-
icance (p value 0.000), is that the series contains a unit root and the alternative





LP˙ Rate of growth of labor productivity
INV˙ Rate of growth of (non-residential) investment, real +
R&D˙ Rate of growth of R&D investment, real +
Mse Share of employment in manufacturing +
Sse Share of employment in the ‘skilled’ service sectors ?
BDse Share of employment in the “Baumol disease” service sectors –
TW Share of temporary employees in total employment –
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hypothesis is that the series is stationary (see Table 9 in the Appendix). Last,
but not least, the residual normality test (see the Kernel test in Fig. 3 in the
Appendix) confirms a symmetric and unimodal distribution.
The econometric exercises seem to substantiate the four channels determining
the dynamics of labor productivity that we listed in the introduction. First of
all, the speed of investment measured by the rate of investment growth, which
has a positive impact on labor productivity growth as expected. Second, the
speed of R&D investment, measured by the rate of investment in R&D, which
also has a positive impact on labor productivity. Third, the flexibility of the
labor market, captured by the increase of temporary employment, which has a
negative impact on the dynamics of labor productivity, as predicted by the
literature discussed in Section 3. Fourth, the direction of structural change: an
increase in the share of employment in manufacturing sustains labor productiv-
ity growth, while the share of employment in the “Baumol’s disease” service
sector has a negative influence on the evolution of this variable, providing
some evidence to support the hypothesis of the persistence of the so-called
Baumol’s disease. On the other hand, the impact exerted by the skilled service
sector – at least in our analysis - is not so straightforward: the sign of the
coefficient is negative but not significant. The message, anyway, is clear in our
view: countries should avoid a specialization toward the service industries
affected by Baumol’s disease, which has a very limited potential for produc-
tivity gains.34
6 Concluding remarks
In recent decades, many advanced economies have witnessed unsatisfying perfor-
mances in terms of labor productivity growth, during a process of institutional and
structural change. At first glance, this may appear puzzling. In the same time period, we
have also witnessed a generalized application of all the ingredients that, according to
most “supply-side” economists and international institutions,35 should have
modernized and enhanced the competitiveness of dynamic and growing economies:
labor market flexibilization and, more generally, structural labor market reforms,
downsizing of the welfare state, market deregulation, privatizations and so on.
However, what we have in fact observed is a prolonged, almost worldwide
productivity slowdown. In the face of this evidence, a major challenge for
mainstream economics arises: how to explain that, after decades of “structural
reforms”, the majority of advanced economies are trapped in an extended
productivity stall?
34 In this respect, a lesson can also be drawn from the growing body of literature on economic complexity.
Even if this is not the main purpose of this paper, it should be recalled that, according to this literature,
countries should pursue a strategy oriented towards complex, sophisticated production, given its likely positive
impact on output and productivity growth and the stimulus it provides to technology and technological
capabilities (see for example Hidalgo et al. 2007; Hidalgo and Hausmann 2009 or Gräbner et al. 2017). It is
reasonable to imagine that complex products tend to be the outcome of specific branches of the manufacturing
industry.
35 See Storm and Naastepad (2015) for an overview.
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In this article, we have attempted to identify possible causes of this slowdown. We
consider it plausible that physical investment is a key determinant of technical progress.
We have also singled out a particular category of investment, R&D investment, because
this expenditure is crucial in the endogenous innovation process. The share of tempo-
rary employees in total employment, as has been found consistently in the relevant
literature, is likely to act as a drag on labor productivity. Among other things, labor
flexibility also tends to be associated with the creation of low-wage, low-productivity
jobs. In this respect, it is interesting to notice that these “Baumol’s disease” jobs are
often concentrated in productive sectors that have limited exposure to international
competition and trade, a feature that should induce further reflection on the
globalization-productivity slowdown link frequently identified in the literature. All
these trends have been discussed in the context of the ongoing radical change in the
productive structures of advanced economies, namely, the gradual abandonment of
manufacturing and the multifaceted process of tertiarization.
We submitted our hypotheses, sketched briefly above, to empirical scrutiny, by
means of a panel data analysis of 25 European countries and the results are broadly
consistent with the theoretical argument put forward in Sections 2–4. The results are
obviously not conclusive and further research is needed, in particular to clearly
disentangle different contributions to labor productivity growth given by the speciali-
zation in different service industries. The role of the State in fostering innovation and
the need for appropriate financing instruments to fund private innovation expenditures
should also be explored to enrich the picture we tried to depict in this article.
Finally, some policy recommendations can be drawn: the global economy is undergo-
ing a radical process of change, which affects productive structures and the international
division of labor. These trends cannot be easily reverted but need to be governed. The need
for coordinated industrial policy is becoming increasingly recognized and established. On
the one hand, as noted inMazzucato et al. (2015, p. 140), a well-designed industrial policy
can drive the economy toward research into improvements in static and dynamic efficien-
cy and enhance firms with better learning processes and a higher potential for technolog-
ical progress, to incentive specialization in commodities (and services) for which global
demand is robust and steady. This is, however, only one side of the story. Dosi et al. (2010)
remind us that Schumpeterian policies, which aim at generating endogenous innovations,
are a necessary but not sufficient condition to maintain the economy on a high-growth,
high-productivity path. Fiscal policies and stimuli to aggregate demand, identified byDosi
et al. (2010, p. 1755) as the “Keynesian engine,” exert a strong complementarity with and
are the natural companion to the Schumpeterian engine.
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Appendix
Table 3 Data and Sources
Time series data Variable Definition Source
Labor productivity
rate of growth





Mse Employment in manufacturing, as a percentage of total




Sse Employment in Information and Communication;
Financial and Insurance activities; Real Estate activities;
Professional, scientific and technical activities, administrative
and support service activities, as a percentage of total




BDse Employment in Wholesale and retail trade, transport,
accommodation and food service activities; Public
administration, defense, education, human health and
social work activities, as a percentage of total employment,




TW Temporary employees, as a percentage of total employees Eurostat
Investment rate
of growth
INV˙ Rate of growth of non-residential real gross fixed
capital formation, excluding R&D real gross fixed capital for-
mation (real gross fixed capital formation, total assets minus
real gross fixed capital formation, dwellings minus real gross










LPconv Labor productivity per hour worked (level), percentage
of EU28 total (based on million purchasing power
standards), current prices
Eurostat
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Table 4 Robustness checks
Explanatory variables (I)
GLS Baseline with total investment
(II)




























Time fixed effect NO No
N. of obs. 528 332
Statistics Wald χ2(5) = 210.80
Prob > χ2 = 0.000
Wald χ2(6) = 161.11
Prob > χ2 = 0.000






Regression results. Dependent variable: Labor productivity growth 1995–2016
a In column I the countries are 27, since we can add Malta and Spain to the countries of our baseline
regressions, where the lack of data for R&D investment prevented the inclusion of these two countries in the
original sample
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1

















































































Australia Canada Japan US
Fig. 2 Rate of growth of labor productivity (moving average over three years). Source: OECD.stat
Table 5 Hausman test
—— Coefficients ——
| (b) (B) (b-B) sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B))
| fixed random Difference S.E.
Mse | .2036235 .0958039 .1078196 .123844
TW | .1754874 −.0528082 .2282956 .0572933
Sse | .2026317 −.0040475 .2066792 .0811314
BDse | −.3019283 −.1425162 −.1594121 .1064865
INV | .058445 .0744523 −.0160073 .0019407
RD | .032939 .0371826 −.0042437 .
b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg
B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg




(V_b-V_B is not positive definite)
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Table 6 Granger test
Panel VAR-Granger causality Wald test
Ho: Excluded variable does not Granger-cause Equation variable
Granger-causes Equation variable
Ha: Excluded variable
| Equation Excluded | chi2 df Prob > chi2 |
| PG | |
| Mse | 2.767 1 0.096 |
| TW | 0.027 1 0.069 |
| Sse | 5.945 1 0.015 |
| BDse | 3.242 1 0.072 |
| INV | 0.024 1 0.077 |
| R&D | 1.049 1 0.006 |
| ALL | 19.978 6 0.003 |
Table 7 Correlation matrix
| LP Mse TW Sse BDse INV R&D
LP | 1.0000
Mse| 0.3265 1.0000
TW| −0.2420 −0.2017 1.0000
Sse| −0.1998 −0.6038 0.2050 1.0000
BDse| −0.3946 −0.4859 0.2960 0.2265 1.0000
INV| 0.3757 0.1373 −0.1019 −0.0792 −0.2059 1.0000
R%D| 0.2470 0.0365 −0.1066 −0.0225 −0.1372 0.1291 1.0000
Table 8 VIF: Variance inflation
factor
Variable | VIF 1/VIF
Mse | 1.98 0.505480
Sse | 1.62 0.618343
BDse | 1.45 0.689265
TW | 1.13 0.886463
INV | 1.06 0.944014
RD | 1.04 0.964483
Mean VIF | 1.38








-10 0 10 20
lab_prodrateofgrowth
kernel = epanechnikov, bandwidth = 0.5234
Kernel density estimate
Fig. 3 Normality test
Table 9 Im-Pesaran-Shin unit-root test
Ho: All panels contain unit roots Number of panels = 29
Ha: Some panels are stationary Avg. number of periods = 20.52
AR parameter: Panel-specific Asymptotics: T,N - > Infinity
Panel means: Included sequentially
Time trend: Not included
ADF regressions: No lags included
Fixed-N exact critical values
Statistic p value 1% 5% 10%
t-bar −3.6074 (Not available)
t-tilde-bar −2.7510
Z-t-tilde-bar −9.4776 0.0000
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Table 11 Labor flexibility and LP growth
Argument Description Expected impact on LP
growth of labor
flexibilization
“Efficiency wages”-style erosion of social capital and trust, reduction
in the effort exerted by workers, need for
a larger share of non-productive,
supervisory workers
–
Unstable labor relations low investment in workforce training
and firm-specific human capital
–
Obstacle to technical change capital-labor substitution, reliance on
labor-intensive production processes
–
Creation of low-productivity jobs Design of routine jobs, concentrated in
low-tech, low-innovation sectors
–
Table 10 Structural change and LP growth
Argument Description Expected impact





Manufacturing imperative innovation spillovers from manufacturing to the rest of
the economy
+
Specific obstacles to innovation
in service industries
the average small size of firms in service industries,





lower productivity gains and a specialization toward




overemphasis on structural change





different service industries can
have a different impact
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